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A B S T R A C T
Research on social sustainability in multi-tier supply chains is limited. Speciﬁcally, we know very little about a)
the micro-processes involved in the way in which sub-suppliers (i.e., ﬁrst-tier suppliers or sourcing agents)
respond to the sustainability requirements imposed by their intermediaries; and b) the micro-level antecedents
that condition their responses. To address these gaps, we used a longitudinal multiple case study method to
explore multiple intermediary – sub-supplier dyads in South India's knitwear garment industry and drew upon
constructs of behavioural economics. We found that the way in which intermediaries frame social sustainability
requirements and their associated procedures inﬂuence both the way in which sub-suppliers perceive the pro-
cedural fairness of those requirements and the way in which they thus reciprocate. When intermediaries frame
social sustainability requirements as ‘opportunity’ and engage in various procedures perceived to be procedu-
rally fair by sub-suppliers, the latter reciprocate positively. Contrastingly, when intermediaries frame social
sustainability requirements as ‘insulation’ and engage in various procedures perceived to be procedurally unfair
by sub-suppliers, the latter reciprocate negatively. Under the production-dominant framing, sub-suppliers ex-
hibit positive reciprocity only related to processing production orders. Our analysis inductively generated
propositions that emphasize the important role played by framing in shaping the perceptions of fairness held by
sub-suppliers towards social sustainability requirements and the reciprocity of the latter's responses to them.
1. Introduction
Social sustainability in supply chains is mainly concerned with im-
proving the rights, welfare and entitlements of workers and enhancing
the quality of their employment (Huq et al., 2016). The increasing
global reach and complexity of many multi-tier global supply chains
poses particular challenges for ‘lead’ ﬁrms trying to manage social
sustainability (Mena et al., 2013). Much of this complexity stems from
the supply chain's exposure to institutional environments characterized
by weak legal frameworks (Khalid et al., 2015). In multi-tier supply
chains, most social sustainability outcomes are, inevitably, a product of
practices and activities that arise beyond the boundaries of the lead
ﬁrm. However, eﬀectively inﬂuencing the practices of ﬁrms beyond
ﬁrst-tier dyadic relationships (direct buyer-supplier) is complicated by
the increasingly global scope of supply relationships (Seuring et al.,
2008), the lack of information on the identity and activities of sub-
suppliers (i.e., second-tier to nth-tier ﬁrms) (Wilhelm et al., 2016), and
the absence or weakness of traditional contractual governance
mechanisms and institutions responsible for enforcing contracts, more
likely in developing countries (Grimm et al., 2014). The challenges
linked to ensuring social sustainability beyond direct supply relation-
ships have meant that many of the severe and damaging examples of
unsustainable conduct have arisen in the context of sub-supplier fac-
tories (Grimm et al., 2016).
The recognition of the diﬃculties associated with directly managing
social sustainability at the sub-supplier level has resulted in lead ﬁrms
transferring the responsibility to ﬁrst-tier suppliers or sourcing agents
(henceforth, intermediaries). For example, Wilhelm et al. (2016)
showed how and under what conditions ﬁrst-tier suppliers take on a
double agency role that sees them acting as agents for their lead ﬁrms
implementing the sustainability requirements in their own operations,
and acting as agents to make their suppliers implement the sustain-
ability requirements imposed by the lead ﬁrms. Similarly,
Soundararajan et al. (2018) explored the boundary-spanning role
played by the sourcing agents commonly found in the textile and gar-
ment supply chains in improving working conditions. They showed
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that, under certain conditions, sourcing agents act as boundary span-
ners performing work aimed at dismantling or bridging the various
boundaries that aﬀect the interaction between lead ﬁrms and sub-
suppliers with respect to improving working conditions. While they
highlighted the shifting roles played by intermediaries, research on the
conditions under which sub-suppliers in developing countries, who
depend on ad-hoc spot production contracts granted by intermediaries,
positively or negatively respond to their social sustainability require-
ments is extremely scant. Speciﬁcally, the extant research has shed
relatively little light on the ‘micro-level behavioural processes’ or
‘micro-processes’ that are involved in the sub-supplier management of
social sustainability requirements and related exchanges between sub-
suppliers and intermediaries. Micro-processes refer to interpersonal and
interactional processes (Staw and Sutton, 2000). Therefore, it is the sub-
supplier - intermediary dyads, and the interaction between them with
respect to social sustainability requirements, especially sub-suppliers’
perceptions of the way in which the requirements are imposed, that are
of central importance to this research.
Therefore, in this article, we ask two questions. a) What micro-
processes are involved in the response of sub-suppliers to the social
sustainability requirements imposed by their intermediaries? b) What
are the micro-level antecedents that condition the responses of sub-
suppliers? We explore these questions by means of an in-depth long-
itudinal multiple case study of intermediary-sub-supplier dyads located
in Tirupur, India. Speciﬁcally, by drawing on theoretical constructs
from behavioural economics—namely, procedural fairness (Folger and
Konovsky, 1989), reciprocity (Fehr and Gächter, 1998) and framing
(Levin et al., 1998)—we explore the conditions under which sub-sup-
pliers perceive social sustainability requirements as either fair or unfair
and, thus, on the likelihood that they will reciprocate in those dyadic
relationships by attempting to meet social sustainability requirements.
Our study of the micro-level processes involved in multi-tier supply
relationships shows the connection between intermediaries' framing of
social sustainability requirements and associated procedures, and sub-
suppliers’ perceptions of fairness and reciprocity.
Our ﬁndings make several important contributions. First, by
adopting a micro-level lens, we show the importance of intermediaries’
framing of sustainability requirements in triggering diﬀerent types of
procedural fairness perceptions and reciprocity in developing country
sub-suppliers. Second, while literature on framing (e.g. Levin et al.,
1998) suggests that framing alone can induce behavioural changes, our
ﬁndings show that framing of social sustainability requirements has to
be coupled with associated procedures to inﬂuence fairness perceptions
and reciprocal behaviour of sub-suppliers. Third, our study contributes
to the crisis literature (Bundy et al., 2017) by capturing framing
maintenance and framing shift induced by crisis situations, and the
importance of establishing positive pre-crisis stakeholder relationships
for eﬀective crisis management. Finally, the study also contributes to
emerging behavioural operations management research by qualita-
tively capturing the micro-level exchanges between sub-suppliers and
intermediaries with respect to social sustainability. These ﬁndings
highlight the importance of moving beyond instrumental approaches to
social sustainability like pressure, ﬁnancial incentives, or penalties and
focus on relational processes like dialogue, collaboration, and trust-
building (Jiang, 2009). We argue that understanding the micro-level
processes is critical for the development of innovative sub-supplier
management practices that encourage improved social sustainability
across multiple tiers of global supply chains.
Our paper proceeds as follows. We begin by oﬀering a review of the
literature on social sustainability in global supply chains, framing,
fairness perception and reciprocity, and present our conceptual model.
Then, we describe the research design adopted to answer the research
questions, followed by a comprehensive discussion of the ﬁndings
emerging from the data. This is followed by a discussion of the ﬁndings
and the development of propositions. Finally, we conclude by oﬀering a
summary of key ﬁndings, and discuss the theoretical and practical
implications, limitations, and future research directions.
2. Literature review
According to Wilhelm et al. (2016), most serious social failures
happen at the sub-supplier level of global supply chains. For instance, in
2011, the Dutch based non-governmental organization (NGO) Centre
for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO) published a report
titled ‘Captured by Cotton’, which exposed the widespread exploitation
of young girls in Indian garment sub-supplier facilities that produce for
well-known brands like ASOS, Next, C & A, Mothercare, and H & M.
This report attracted numerous local and international activists, media
coverage, and public debates pressurizing brands and retailers. The
social impact of the poor management of social sustainability issues in
developing country supplier facilities is immense. Continuing occur-
rences of worker suicide in the factory of Apple's Chinese supplier
Foxconn (The Wall Street Journal, 2016), ﬁre accidents in Bangladeshi
factories even after the Rana Plaza disaster (AlJazeera, 2016), and
modern slavery practices in supplier facilities in Southern India (Indian
Committee of the Netherlands, 2017) are some instances of key evi-
dence of the inadequate management of social sustainability.
Given the weak regulatory settings found in these contexts, private
social sustainability requirements—in the form of third-party certiﬁ-
cations and lead ﬁrm codes of conduct (CoCs)—have emerged as the
primary means through which lead ﬁrms monitor and improve social
sustainability in their supply chains (Locke et al., 2009). These re-
quirements are rooted in International Labor Organization (ILO) con-
ventions and local regulations, and share the common intention of
improving social sustainability in supply chains. Although social sus-
tainability requirements are growing, research, media, and NGO reports
frequently remind us of their serious limitations in bringing about
genuine improvements. Some scholars have even argued that, at times,
such requirements push suppliers to engage in unethical behaviours
(e.g., Awaysheh and Klassen, 2010; Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen,
2014).
Until recently, very few studies focussed on the ways in which social
sustainability requirements must be designed and implemented for
improved compliance among developing country suppliers (e.g.,
Bartley, 2011; Jiang, 2009). For example, Bartley (2011) developed an
institutional layering approach and argued that, to increase com-
pliance, social sustainability requirements must be layered on multiple
other institutional norms and regulations in the contexts in which
suppliers are located. Based upon a study of Chinese apparel and textile
suppliers, Jiang (2009) argued that an arm's length relationship man-
agement approach reduces compliance among suppliers, while a col-
laborative one improves it.
Due to the complexity of their global supply chains, it is problematic
for lead ﬁrms to manage suppliers beyond those in ﬁrst-tier (Wilhelm
et al., 2016). Because of their indirect relationship with sub-suppliers,
information asymmetry, and limited transparency, the traditional con-
trol and/or pressure exercised by lead ﬁrms tend to have limited in-
ﬂuence on the former's behaviours (Grimm et al., 2016). Thus, lead
ﬁrms transfer the responsibility of managing sub-suppliers to their ﬁrst-
tier suppliers or middlemen (Grimm et al., 2014). According to Wilhelm
et al. (2016), ﬁrst-tier suppliers or middlemen act as intermediaries and
play a double agent role by implementing sustainability in their own
operations and by ensuring that their own suppliers comply with the
requirements of sustainability standards. These important insights
notwithstanding, we still lack an in-depth understanding of the devel-
oping country sub-suppliers’ perspectives and behaviours towards so-
cial sustainability demands and the micro-level interactions occurring
between the intermediaries and the sub-suppliers that shape them.
2.1. Challenges faced by developing country sub-suppliers
Sub-suppliers in developing countries face at least three challenges
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when dealing with social sustainability requirements. The ﬁrst is re-
source scarcity; most developing country sub-suppliers, especially in
the garment and textile industry, are small and resource-deprived
(Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi, 2010). They lack the resources, skills, net-
works, knowledge, and other organizational capabilities required to
decipher and manage sustainability requirements. They depend on lead
ﬁrms and intermediaries for their survival (Lund-Thomsen and
Lindgreen, 2014), and earn proﬁts lower than those made by lead ﬁrms
and intermediaries. Consequently, unlike corporations, they do not
employ highly educated and trained strategists or corporate responsi-
bility oﬃcials to help them cope with sustainability requirements. Their
everyday management routines are likely to be simple and relational.
They utilize their social networks to informally acquire the knowledge
pertaining to operating a factory or a farm (Ernst and Kim, 2002). Some
factories and farms are owned by former workers, and as owners, they
utilize the knowledge gained during their employment (Soundararajan
and Brown, 2016). The acquisition of social sustainability related
knowledge is path dependent (Wiengarten and Pagell, 2012) and may
require strong learning and future orientations. Being led by former
workers or farmers, most sub-suppliers in developing countries face a
steep learning curve without having the appropriate foundational skills
and orientations. Therefore, their social sustainability strategies are
likely to be informal, ad hoc, and experiential.
Second, they face ﬁerce competition. More often than not, the
quantity of orders they receive is unevenly spread out across any given
year (Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen, 2014). Also, they are not perma-
nently contracted to intermediaries. Intermediaries grant them informal
spot production order contracts, the traditional nature of commercial
relationships at this level, especially in developing countries. Sub-sup-
pliers need to ﬁercely compete with numerous similar ﬁrms to obtain
these contracts. Consequently, to survive, they often feel compelled to
violate labour regulations and push their workers to make the most of a
given order (Awaysheh and Klassen, 2010). Some sub-suppliers go to
the extreme of simultaneously processing multiple production orders
(Soundararajan et al., 2016).
The third challenge is the lack of institutional and market support in
developing countries (Mair and Marti, 2009). Developed countries are
furnished with advanced institutional arrangements and eﬃcient
market intermediaries. In contrast, developing countries are char-
acterized by absent and/or weak institutional arrangements and market
imperfections, which obstruct eﬃcient production, capital, and labour
market activities, and the resultant social and economic development
(Khanna and Palepu, 2000). Managing social sustainability require-
ments is thus not straightforward or formulaic (Grimm et al., 2016), nor
is it reinforced by supporting institutions and markets. Rather, sub-
suppliers, with their limited resources and knowledge, need to navigate
in and around (Mair and Marti, 2009) such weak and/or absent in-
stitutional and market arrangements to meet requirements by means of
whatever is at hand.
2.2. Fairness perception and reciprocity
Economic theories—such as resource dependence theory (Taylor
et al., 1996), transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1979), and
agency theory (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992)—posit that, under fa-
vourable real world conditions such as those described above, in-
dividuals engage in deceptive or opportunistic activities in the pursuit
of their own self-interest. According to Granovetter (1985), these the-
ories do not consider social behaviour and include any value beyond
that of the economic exchange sought by individuals. Decades of be-
havioural economics research have suggested that, when faced with
pressures, uncertainty, information asymmetry, and high stake condi-
tions (Fehr et al., 2002), not all individuals act as self-interested utility
maximizers (Bosse et al., 2009). Instead, individual actions are condi-
tioned by ‘bounded self-interest’—i.e., they assess the fairness of other
parties and reciprocate accordingly, which is diﬀerent from
unconditional behaviour such as selﬂessness (Bowles and Gintis, 2000).
The theory of bounded self-interest suggests that individuals assess
the behaviour of others against two norms of fairness—namely, dis-
tributional and procedural (Bosse and Phillips, 2016). Distributional
fairness is concerned with fairness in relation to “the material outcomes
for the various parties of a pattern of allocation” (Bosse et al., 2009:
450). Procedural fairness refers to “the perceived fairness of the means
used” (Folger and Konovsky, 1989: 115) to make and implement de-
cisions. We focus only on procedural fairness, as this study is about the
sub-suppliers’ perception of the way in which intermediaries enforce
their sustainability requirements and not about their perception of the
distribution of outcomes or rewards related to complying with social
sustainability requirements.
The theory of bounded self-interest further suggests that individuals
assess the behaviours of others against norms of fairness and engage in
either positive or negative reciprocity. Fehr and Gächter (2000: 159)
deﬁne positive reciprocity as reﬂecting the tendency that “in response
to friendly actions, people are frequently much nicer and much more
cooperative than predicted by [the] self-interest model”; and negative
reciprocity as involving behaviour such that “in response to hostile
actions they are frequently much more nasty and even brutal”. Ac-
cording to Fehr and Gächter (1998), individuals reciprocate positively
or negatively in order to preserve the fairness norms even if it incurs
costs and sacriﬁces (Bosse et al., 2009). As Fehr et al. (2002) put it,
individuals are prepared “to sacriﬁce resources for rewarding fair and
punishing unfair behaviour even if this is costly and provides neither
present nor future material rewards for the reciprocator”. Further, re-
search has suggested that fairness norms are not merely intrinsic; si-
tuational or contextual factors such as culture (Li and Cropanzano,
2009) and regulatory focus (Brockner et al., 2008) inﬂuence the sig-
niﬁcance and meaning of fairness or unfairness in a given context.
Few studies in the operations and production management litera-
ture have emphasized the importance of the perceptions of fairness for
improving the performance of supply chain relationships (e.g., Griﬃth
et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2014). For example, based on a study of 290
supply chain relationships, Griﬃth et al. (2006) showed that the dis-
tributors’ positive procedural and distributive perceptions of fairness of
supplier policies enhanced the relationship with their suppliers, de-
creased conﬂicts of interests, and increased satisfaction and perfor-
mance. Based on data collected from 302 Chinese buying ﬁrms, Wang
et al. (2014) argued that suppliers can mitigate the trust damage caused
by their disruptive activities by employing the planned use of fairness
approaches, which, in turn, repair trust and strengthen supply chain
relationships.
2.3. Framing and fairness perception
A typical decision problem involves analyses of risky and riskless
prospects. Possible outcomes of particular choice and the probabilities
of these outcomes characterise a risky or a riskless prospect (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979). A risky prospect, however, can be framed either in
a positive or a negative manner. According to Levin et al. (1998),
presenting an object, event, or outcome in a positive or a negative
manner—while holding its objective value constant—can inﬂuence an
individual's perception, judgment, and attitude towards that object,
event, or outcome. Positive framing highlights gains and negative
framing highlights losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Thaler, 1985).
Therefore, when an object, event, or outcome is presented in a positive
frame, individuals perceive it more positively than when presented in a
negative one.
The power of framing and the positive work it can do has been
highlighted in various studies. For example, Levin et al. (1998) found
that consumers perceived a beef product labelled “75% lean” more
positively than a similar product labelled “25% fat”. Positive framing
evokes positive associations in individuals’ memories and causes them
to perceive an object, event, or outcome more positively compared to
V. Soundararajan, S. Brammer Journal of Operations Management 58–59 (2018) 42–58
44
negative framing, which evokes negative associations. Boström (2003),
for example, shows how environmental NGOs like Forest Stewardship
Council (FSC) use framing to persuade business organisations to engage
in concrete actions towards resolving environmental issues. Although
numerous business organisations are increasingly showing interest in
taking care of the environment, knowledge uncertainty related to en-
vironmental issues - caused by a complex mix of factors, spread over
space and time and often unperceivable by direct senses – presents
them with ample puzzling and contradictory information. Through
construction and dissemination of diverse environmental knowledge
into a framing that symbolically (e.g. sustainability standards) diﬀer-
entiates risk-winners and risk-losers, environmental NGOs provoke
business actors to act (Boström, 2003).
These theoretical constructs can be applied to the context of the sub-
supplier perceived procedural fairness of social sustainability require-
ments, based upon which they need to distribute limited resources to
various organizational activities, including implementing the require-
ments. An application of these constructs will suggest that when social
sustainability requirements are presented in a positive frame and are
supported by constructive procedures like open communication, then
sub-suppliers perceive them to be procedurally fair and reciprocate
positively; whereas when social sustainability requirements are pre-
sented in a negative frame and are accompanied by unsupportive pro-
cedures like absent or limited communication, then sub-suppliers per-
ceive them to be procedurally unfair and reciprocate negatively.
2.4. The eﬀect of crisis on framing and fairness perception
We began the study by adopting a framework based on the above-
mentioned theoretical constructs. However, tragic crises took place
during our study that enabled us to explore how major events can alter
the way that intermediaries frame social sustainability requirements
and sub-supplier perceptions of fairness and reciprocity. Within an or-
ganizational context, a crisis can be deﬁned as “an event perceived by
managers and stakeholders as highly salient, unexpected, and poten-
tially disruptive—can threaten an organization's goals and have pro-
found implications for its relationships with stakeholders” (Bundy et al.,
2017: 1662). Research on crisis management suggests that a crisis
evokes various negative emotions like sadness, anxiety, anger, and
fright (Jin et al., 2012). Hence, those individuals who experience a
crisis will present emotional needs or demands that must be taken into
consideration during any exchange conducted with them (Kahn et al.,
2013; Ulmer, 2001). Any supportive or unsupportive behaviour to-
wards those who are experiencing the crisis have strong eﬀects on their
emotions. During a crisis, supportive behaviours evoke positive emo-
tions, while unsupportive ones evoke negative emotions (Kim and
Cameron, 2011). These emotional impulses amplify the extant per-
ceptions of fairness—or lack thereof—held towards those who are ex-
hibiting supportive or unsupportive behaviours; these ampliﬁed per-
ceptions lead to stronger reciprocal behaviours (Han et al., 2007). For
example, Han et al. (2007) demonstrated that, during a crisis, any sti-
mulation of anger will lead to unfair perceptions of the related party.
Any emotional instability that emerges during a crisis also drives
individuals to analyse/reanalyse their particular framing of an object,
event, or outcome (Coombs, 2007; Kim and Cameron, 2011). These
constructs suggest that crises can inﬂuence the framing of sustainability
requirements enacted by intermediaries, and the subsequent percep-
tions of fairness and reciprocity held by sub-suppliers.
These discussions open up three important questions. Under what
conditions do sub-suppliers perceive social sustainability requirements
as procedurally either fair or unfair, and thus reciprocate positively or
negatively? How and under what conditions do diﬀerent framings of
social sustainability requirements cause them to be perceived as pro-
cedurally either fair or unfair? How do crises inﬂuence framing, fairness
perceptions, and reciprocity in intermediary-supplier dyads? We pre-
sent the conceptual framework that will guide our study—derived from
our literature review—in Fig. 1.
3. Methods
Research on social sustainability is in its early stages (Huq et al.,
2016); we especially know very little about the micro-processes in-
volved in how sub-suppliers in developing countries perceive and re-
spond to the social sustainability requirements of their intermediaries
(buying agents or ﬁrst-tier suppliers), and what micro-level antecedents
condition their responses. Hence, we followed the suggestions made by
Ketokivi and Choi (2014), and espoused an exploratory approach to
theory development. According to Yin (2009), the case study is the
preferred method of conducting exploratory research. The unit of
analysis, i.e., case, in our research is an intermediary-sub-supplier dyad.
Case studies enable researchers to collect signiﬁcant and rich data on
social processes by means of multiple methods—such as interviews,
observations, and documents—thus enabling triangulation. Such data
enable researchers to perform an in-depth exploration of the complex
events, interactions, experiences, and processes occurring across a
supply chain (Barratt et al., 2011).
Speciﬁcally, we opted for a longitudinal multiple case study re-
search design. The multiple case study method is more suited than the
single case approach to develop a rich, reliable, and analytically gen-
eralizable theoretical framework (Ellram, 1996). It oﬀers an opportu-
nity to compare and contrast diﬀerent cases, which improves external
validity (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009). A longitudinal approach enables
more accurate observation of changes occurring in supply chain struc-
tures and relationships over time. Like experiments, longitudinal stu-
dies are not powerful enough to detect causal relationships, but they are
suited to observe the chronological order of events and the phenomena
that connect them (Wall and Clegg, 1981).
3.1. Empirical context
We focussed on knitwear garment sub-suppliers operating in the
Tirupur exporting cluster in India. The textile and garment product
market is notoriously volatile and unpredictable; consequently, Western
manufacturers have sought the low-skilled and low-cost segment of the
labour market, resulting in a dramatic increase in the volume of textile
and garment production being outsourced to developing countries
Fig. 1. The conceptual model.
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(Pickles, 2006). According to the Indian Ministry of Textiles (2012), the
Tirupur cluster accounts for about 60% of India's total knitwear gar-
ment exports. Of this, 55% is exported to Europe (including the UK),
35% to the United States of America, and the remaining 10% to the
Middle East, Australia, and South America. The Tirupur Exporters' As-
sociation (TEA) estimates that the knitwear cluster comprises over
10,000 production and supporting units. At the same time, the cluster
continues to be criticized for occurrences of unethical labour practices.
Hence, this context is ideal for this study, as it comprises a large con-
centration of (mostly small-scale) sub-suppliers to global brands, many
of which face constant pressures to comply with various types of sus-
tainability requirements in the midst of resource constraints, heavy
competition, lack of capabilities and institutional support, and heigh-
tened pressure to meet production parameters (i.e., cost, quality, and
time).
3.2. Case selection
Case selection is the most important part of theory building through
the case study method (Yin, 2009). Given that the study focuses on the
micro-level processes, “the problem is conceptualised at the level of the
relationship” between two actors, and the analysis focuses at the “in-
terpersonal or inter-dyadic, providing information about the pattern
between individuals or between relationships” (Thompson and Walker,
1982: 890). Therefore, our primary unit of analysis is an intermediary -
sub-supplier dyad or the relationship itself. The cases/dyads were se-
lected based on three criteria (Table 1).
Our study is based on 11 intermediary-sub-supplier dyads (with one
intermediary connected to two sub-suppliers) that satisﬁed all these
criteria. These dyads are connected through informal spot production
order contracts. Because the sub-suppliers units are small, their owners
also play the role of managers. They are highly entrepreneurial with
relatively limited resources and capabilities; underdeveloped manage-
ment systems, administrative procedures, and techniques; and a dis-
organised and informal management style. Wherever possible, we in-
terviewed sustainability oﬃcers or social auditors of the lead ﬁrms. See
Tables 2–4 for the proﬁles of the sub-suppliers and other stakeholders.
3.3. Data collection
The qualitative data were collected between December 2012 and
May 2017, primarily by means of semi-structured interviews, with
secondary data collected through informal conversations, observations,
and documentary evidence. The interviews helped us “… to gather
descriptions of the life-world of the interviewee with respect to the
interpretation of the meaning” (Kvale, 1983: 174) of the social sus-
tainability requirements and their responses. We mainly focussed on the
ﬁrst-hand historical accounts of the sub-suppliers’ and their
intermediaries’ experiences of social sustainability requirements, and of
the ways in which they managed them over time. The sub-supplier-
intermediary dyads were selected based on their current on-going re-
lationships. Given that multiple dyadic relationships can exist for a sub-
supplier or an intermediary, sub-supplier behaviour can be subjected to
possible spillover eﬀects due to a) the framing of other current inter-
mediaries and b) the framing of other past intermediaries. We used
multiple compartmentalisation strategies to keep the data as unique as
possible to the selected dyads. First, we selected the dyads with greater
numbers of trade exchanges. Second, we allowed our interview ques-
tions to be driven by events unique to a particular dyad. Finally, we
interviewed stakeholders relevant to the events described by dyads for
conﬁrmation. Also, the process through which we gained access to the
intermediaries and the sub-suppliers helped in maintaining the focus.
Additional interviews were conducted with key stakeholders, in-
cluding trade union leaders, NGO representatives, sustainability oﬃcers
or social auditors of lead ﬁrms, workers, and Tirupur Exporters’
Association representatives. In total, 111 interviews were conducted
between December 2012 and May 2017 (42 between December 2012
and May 2013, 12 between June 2014 and July 2014, 27 between
November 2015 and March 2016, and 30 between March 2017 and May
2017). On average, the interviews lasted between 20 and 60min, most
were recorded in the native language, transcribed verbatim along with
background information, and translated into English where necessary.
The translations were validated though an objective back translation
process aided by a friend of the ﬁrst author.
To gain a deeper understanding of the sub-suppliers’ everyday work
practices, their relationships, and their ongoing dialogue with organi-
zational actors and stakeholders, the interviews were supported by data
collected through numerous non-participant observations at the sub-
suppliers’ production facilities. To gain a candid account of events,
accounts, beliefs, and aspirations, in addition to the interviews and
observations, data was collected through informal conversations with
interviewees and non-interviewees held during numerous pre- and post-
interview sessions, observations, and feedback sessions. Detailed notes
were taken during and after the observations and informal conversa-
tions. Further, we reviewed key documents and databases that provided
information about the context, labour practices, social sustainability
requirements, lead ﬁrms, regulatory frameworks, and global supply
chain practices in India and similar other contexts.
3.4. Analytic method
We systematically analysed the data using the recommended ana-
lytic approach for process research (Langley, 1999). In Table 5, we
summarize the data analytic method employed. In Table 6, we show
how we operationalised the key constructs for coding purposes.
Table 1
Case selection criteria.
Criteria Selection Details
The sub-suppliers must be of similar size, at second-tier level,
and located in the same geographical region so that they
share similar institutional conditions.
We selected small second-tier sub-suppliers
located in Tirupur knitwear cluster. The number of
workers in these facilities ranged from 26 to 100.
Access to part of the sub-suppliers was gained through the
ﬁrst author’s local networks. Additionally, some
intermediaries helped to gain access to their sub-suppliers.
The ﬁrst author is ﬂuent in Tamil (the local language),
which enabled him to collect rich data.
The intermediaries must be located in the same location as
that of the sub-suppliers. The intermediaries and sub-
suppliers are connected through formal spot production
order contracts – traditional nature of trade relationships
at this level, especially in developing countries.
The intermediaries in our sample are located in
Tirupur. The sub-suppliers and intermediaries are
connected to each other through spot contracts.
Access to part of the intermediaries was gained through the
ﬁrst author’s local networks. Some sub-suppliers helped to
gain access to their intermediaries. This also helped us to
maintain the focus on dyads during interviews.
The dyads must deal with diﬀerent types of social
sustainability requirements.
For some dyads, certiﬁcation mechanisms deﬁne
social sustainability requirements and for others
codes deﬁne social sustainability requirements.
This is to develop a comprehensive understanding of micro-
level dynamics how social sustainability requirements when
framed diﬀerently invoke diﬀerent perceptions and
behaviours of sub-suppliers.
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4. Intermediaries' framing of social sustainability requirements
and sub-suppliers’ fairness perceptions
Our analysis showed diﬀerences in the way in which the inter-
mediaries framed their social sustainability requirements (i.e., working
conditions). Some framed them as ‘opportunity’ to their sub-suppliers:
(I2-SS3, I3-SS4, I5-SS6, I6-SS7 and I8-SS9); some as ‘insulation’ to theirs
(I1-SS1 and SS2, I4-SS5, I9-SS10 and I10-SS11); and some ‘production-
dominant’ to theirs (I7-SS8). Below we report the micro-processes i.e.
how these framings and associated procedures lead to perceived pro-
cedural fairness or unfairness of sub-suppliers (sections 4.1 and 4.2).
This will be followed by an analysis of patterns of factors that prompted
an intermediary to adopt a particular type of framing and associated
procedures (section 4.3). Finally, we show how a particular perception
of fairness resulted in speciﬁc reciprocity behaviour of sub-suppliers
(section 4.4). Also, see Appendices 1 and 2 for more illustrative codes.
4.1. Opportunity framing, procedures and fairness perception
In the opportunity framing, the sustainability requirements were
presented as an opportunity to improve the externally- and internally-
oriented capabilities required for meeting both current and future
market demands. Speciﬁcally, they were framed as a way to gain access
to more resources, increase productivity, improve worker skills, im-
prove long-term business relationships, gain access to more production
orders, increase prices, and, eventually, move up the supply chain. For
example, an Intermediary (I2) framed them as follows: Improving labour
practices won't happen in a day. You have to highlight the positives. There is
so much they can learn. It disciplines the way they do business. They [SS3]
can see a total change. Another intermediary (I5) said: They [SS6] learnt
everything through experience. They replicate what they learned when they
were workers. I have to teach them. I have to tell them [SS6] that compliance
is important for the long-term. The requirements were also presented as
an opportunity to gain legitimacy among key local stakeholders, in-
cluding community and trade associations, as the intermediary (I2)
framed: If they keep their workers happy, they can gain their trust.
Under such a framing, intermediaries engaged in various procedures
to enable sub-suppliers meet their requirements, namely a) engaging in
constructive dialogue, b) creating awareness and sharing of knowledge,
and c) oﬀering ﬁnancial incentives. Intermediaries under this framing
category engaged in frequent dialogue (ranging from at least once a
month to once every four months) with their sub-suppliers and shared
knowledge to address any challenges and complexities arising in the
process of meeting the requirements. For example, wearing metal
gloves is mandatory while working with risk-prone cutting machines,
but the workers in a sub-supplier's (SS3) facility ignored their owner's
and supervisors' continuous pleas, giving the hot weather as a reason.
The sub-supplier reported it to the intermediary owner (I2), who then
consulted his network and ordered his managers to gather ideas on how
to improve worker awareness on health and safety issues. The inter-
mediary then shared the ideas gathered, namely compulsory health and
safety training programmes and hanging pictures of cutting machine
accidents in places where workers congregate, with the sub-supplier.
The intermediary (I2) said: These certiﬁcation companies basically work in
favour of buyers. They do not understand such smaller issues. I have to
interfere.
In another example, on identifying that a sub-supplier (SS7) lacked
awareness of labour regulations, the intermediary (I6) arranged for his
manager to visit the sub-supplier to create legal awareness. Also, the
intermediary shared some of the printed materials with regulations to
be displayed around the factory. The intermediary (I6) said: Not many in
this industry know what the labour laws say. My supplier [SS7] was
struggling to meet my requirements. I just asked for regulations. I asked my
manager to visit his factory to create awareness. After visiting the factory,
my manager gave me the idea of sharing the print materials we have.
Some intermediaries under this framing also oﬀered ﬁnancial in-
centives to their sub-suppliers. For example, a sub-supplier (SS9) was
employing many temporary contract workers who were employed
seasonally for long hours, low wages, and no social security beneﬁts. A
major portion of the contract workers in Tirupur comes from North
India. When a trade union's protest against employing contract workers
hit the media, the intermediary (I8) had to intervene. He oﬀered his
sub-supplier a deal that would involve an increase in price if he either
reduced the number of contract workers employed or made them per-
manent. In another example, as one sub-supplier said (SS4): I needed
money to build toilets. I had ﬁnancial constraints at that time. I visited my
bank numerous times. They asked for this document and that document. I
shared my frustration with him [I3]; he immediately made a phone call to
the bank manager and asked him to help me out.
Despite knowing that the sustainability requirements of these in-
termediaries may have some underlying strategic motives, such con-
structive and considerate procedures led to sub-suppliers perceiving the
sustainability requirements as fair. For example, talking about the in-
termediary's (I3) phone call to the bank manager, sub-supplier said
(SS4): How many out there will be willing to make a phone call to the bank
manager for you? Even my relatives won't. It is very rare these days to ﬁnd
such people… I can say that he [I3] won't ask for unnecessary things.When
issues surfaced, sub-suppliers engaged in dialogue with their inter-
mediaries to reach an understanding, and resolve points of diﬀerence.
Speciﬁcally, they did so in order to clearly understand the expectations
of their intermediaries. Fig. 2 depicts these arguments.
4.2. Positive reciprocity
Where sub-suppliers perceived their intermediaries’ framing of
sustainability requirements and associated procedures as fair, our
Table 2
Sub-suppliers’ proﬁle.
Sub-suppliers Registered number of
workers (including
changes overtime)
Sustainability
requirements
Connected intermediaries
(i.e. sourcing agents or
ﬁrst-tier suppliers)
Interviewees December
2012–May
2013
June
2014–July
2014
November
2015–March 2016
March
2017–May
2017
SS1 50–60 Sedex, BSCI I1 Owner * * *
SS2 72–80 BSCI I1 Owner * * *
SS3 40–50 BSCI I2 Owner * * *
SS4 50–75 BSCI I3 Owner * * *
SS5 90–100 WRAP, BSCI I4 Owner * * *
SS6 70–75 Codes I5 Owner * * *
SS7 32–40 Codes I6 Owner * *
SS8 26–35 No requirement I7 Owner * * *
SS9 50–60 Codes I8 Owner * *
SS10 50–60 Codes I9 Owner * * *
SS11 50–60 Codes I10 Owner
Supervisor
* * (After closure) * (After
closure)
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evidence shows that sub-suppliers tended to reciprocate positively. The
scope of positive reciprocity was manifested in a number of diﬀerent
ways, ranging from meeting minimum requirements to improving em-
ployee relations. For example, with respect to the case of contract
workers, the sub-supplier (SS9) positively reciprocated by reducing the
number of contract workers, increasing the wages of those who re-
mained and oﬀering them festival bonuses instead of social security. In
the labour law example discussed above, the sub-supplier (SS7) re-
ciprocated by displaying all the print materials around the factory and
ordering supervisors to learn them. Similarly, in the cutting machine
example, SS3 reciprocated by hanging awareness creating accident
pictures on the walls of the shop ﬂoor and the dining hall.
While the sub-suppliers in this category reciprocated positively by
attempting to meet the minimum compliance requirements, there were
some occurrences of improvements in employee relations. For example,
a sub-supplier (SS7) organized an excursion for his workers to Ooty, a
nearby hill station, for having successfully executed a production order.
Another sub-supplier (SS6) started inviting his workers to an annual
event, called “kada vettu”, that he organizes to thank his family-deity
with an animal sacriﬁce. He said: Some of them have been with me for very
long time. This is the day I thank them. They come to the “kada vettu” like a
family. Eat well and bless me. These activities eventually increased
workers' morale, as one of his workers said: … I feel good about working
for my owner. While numerous unobserved factors could have con-
tributed to these diﬀerences in positive reciprocity, including sub-sup-
pliers’ personal attributes and resource availability, our evidence
strongly suggests that mutually respectful and understanding relation-
ships within dyads tends to generate more reciprocal relationships in-
volving greater attention to social sustainability requirements.
4.3. Insulation framing, procedures and fairness perception
In the insulation framing, the social sustainability requirements
were presented to the sub-suppliers as a risk aversion mechanism.
Speciﬁcally, they were presented as a shield against negative stake-
holder reactions, as one intermediary (I1) said: My buyer is afraid of any
exposure. So, I'm very careful.
Under such a framing, intermediaries engaged in various proce-
dures, namely a) engaging in limited dialogue and knowledge sharing,
and b) adoption of a threatening attitude. The interactions between sub-
suppliers and intermediaries were less frequent (ranging from once to
three times per year) than they were under the opportunity framing.
For example, in the case of sub-supplier SS5 in the insulation framing,
the intermediary visited the factory once or twice per year. His man-
agers visited to drop and collect orders, or the sub-supplier himself was
asked to visit the intermediary's oﬃce to collect and drop orders.
Very little ad-hoc knowledge sharing related to improving working
conditions occurred, as one sub-supplier (SS5) said: We have not spoken
a lot about working conditions. My job is to process the orders. As far as I do
that, they [I4] are happy. The sub-suppliers are not given a platform to
raise their concerns (or their concerns were disregarded) about the
complexities arising in the process of meeting the sustainability re-
quirements. For example, sub-suppliers are required to maintain 9 h a
day and 48 h a week working time limits. On exceeding these limits, a
worker is entitled to overtime payment of double the ordinary rate of
wages. Although a worker can work overtime, the total number of
weekly working hours, including overtime, should not exceed 60 h.
When sub-supplier (SS11) could not maintain these working hours
during peak seasons, he approached his intermediary (I10) for advice.
He was told that he had to maintain it by whatever means possible, as
the sub-supplier said: Nothing. I had to manage it myself.
Some intermediaries used threat as a mechanism to make their sub-
suppliers meet the requirements, as one intermediary (I9) said: I do not
want to lose my business. He [SS10] does not want to lose his business
either. For example, sub-supplier (SS11), on realizing the likelihood of a
delay in the delivery of orders, reached out to his intermediary (I10) forTa
bl
e
3
In
te
rm
ed
ia
ri
es
’p
ro
ﬁ
le
.
In
te
rm
ed
ia
ri
es
(i
.e
.s
ou
rc
in
g
ag
en
ts
or
ﬁ
rs
t-
ti
er
su
pp
lie
rs
)
C
on
ne
ct
ed
su
b-
su
pp
lie
rs
A
pp
ro
xi
m
at
e
re
gi
on
al
de
pe
nd
en
cy
of
le
ad
ﬁ
rm
on
in
te
rm
ed
ia
ry
K
ey
le
ad
ﬁ
rm
re
gi
on
In
te
rv
ie
w
ee
s
D
ec
em
be
r
20
12
–M
ay
20
13
Ju
ne
20
14
–J
ul
y
20
14
N
ov
em
be
r
20
15
–M
ar
ch
20
16
M
ar
ch
20
17
–M
ay
20
17
I1
SS
1
an
d
SS
2
70
%
N
or
th
A
m
er
ic
a
So
ur
ci
ng
ag
en
t
-
O
w
ne
r
*
*
*
I2
SS
3
65
%
Eu
ro
pe
Fi
rs
t-
ti
er
su
pp
lie
r
-
O
w
ne
r
*
*
I3
SS
4
50
%
N
or
th
A
m
er
ic
a
Fi
rs
t-
ti
er
su
pp
lie
r
-
O
w
ne
r
*
*
I4
SS
5
40
%
U
ni
te
d
K
in
gd
om
So
ur
ci
ng
ag
en
t
-
O
w
ne
r
*
*
*
I5
SS
6
30
%
Eu
ro
pe
So
ur
ci
ng
ag
en
t
-
O
w
ne
r
*
*
*
I6
SS
7
55
%
N
or
th
A
m
er
ic
a
Fi
rs
t-
ti
er
su
pp
lie
r
-
O
w
ne
r
*
*
*
I7
SS
8
60
%
Eu
ro
pe
So
ur
ci
ng
ag
en
t
-
O
w
ne
r
*
*
*
I8
SS
9
40
%
U
ni
te
d
K
in
gd
om
So
ur
ci
ng
ag
en
t
-
O
w
ne
r
*
*
*
I9
SS
10
75
%
Eu
ro
pe
Fi
rs
t-
ti
er
su
pp
lie
r
-
O
w
ne
r
*
*
I1
0
SS
11
20
%
Eu
ro
pe
So
ur
ci
ng
ag
en
t
-
O
w
ne
r
*
*
V. Soundararajan, S. Brammer Journal of Operations Management 58–59 (2018) 42–58
48
an extension. The intermediary rejected the request and threatened the
sub-supplier with ﬁnancial penalties and termination of future re-
lationship, as the sub-supplier said: There was a delay in the dying pro-
cess. So, automatically there was a delay in processing the order. He [I10]
knows these things happen. But, he was not ready to listen. He was angry. He
said if I do not process the orders on time, he will reduce the payment and
stop giving me orders.
Such inconsiderate and hostile procedures from intermediaries led
to sub-suppliers perceiving the sustainability requirements as unfair.
For example, one sub-supplier (SS2) said: Their [his intermediary] ﬁrst
priority is to protect themselves. In the above working hours example, the
sub-supplier (SS11) said: They [his intermediary] know how peak seasons
are. To maintain good relationship with their customers, they [I10] pres-
surize us. We are scapegoats for them. Fig. 3 depicts these arguments.
4.4. Negative reciprocity
When sub-suppliers perceived their intermediaries' framing of sus-
tainability requirements and associated procedures as unfair, they re-
ciprocated negatively. Our evidence shows that the negative reciprocity
was manifested in the form of distrust or hostility and deception.
Because of lack of support and insensitivity, a sense of hostility existed
among these sub-suppliers. When asked about the relationship, one sub-
supplier (SS11) frustratingly said: … respect is very important. If you
[I10] respect me, I respect you. If you trust me, I trust you. If you are a
businessman, I'm a businessman too.
To preserve their business, they engaged in unethical or illegal ac-
tivities, including making workers work overtime for no extra pay,
paying low salaries, producing false records, employing high numbers
of contract workers, not covering social security beneﬁts, and not
providing proper toilet facilities (as observed by the ﬁrst author). In the
working hours example mentioned above, one worker from SS11's
factory said: We work 12-h shifts. Close to the delivery deadline, we work
more. The owner gets us coﬀee, tea and snacks … We do not get extra pay.
In order to evade legal actions, double records were used to log falsiﬁed
working hours, wages, and social security payments, and were used to
manipulate labour inspectors and social auditors. For example, a sub-
supplier (SS1) said: The conversion value is in dollars and the margin is
very low. I normally get less than a dollar per ﬁnished garment. I can get a
higher margin [meaning proﬁt] only if I do more business … This is my only
source of income. I didn't have any other choice. I had to do double records
to give them what they need.
Also, some sub-suppliers bribed government authorities to obtain
their authorization, and since corruption is prevalent in Tirupur, it was
easy for sub-suppliers to manipulate government authorities in order to
achieve apparent compliance with the requirements of social sustain-
ability requirements. There were also instances where workers were
coerced into being complicit with non-compliance. Sub-suppliers used
their authority by ordering their workers to act according to their di-
rectives. In cases of resistive workers, they terminated their employ-
ment, as one worker of the sub-supplier (SS10) said: I didn't agree with
my [previous] owner. He was afraid that that I may speak up during the
audits. Then one day he asked me to leave the company.
Table 4
Stakeholders’ proﬁle and number of interviews.
Stakeholders December 2012–May 2013 June 2014–July 2014 November 2015–March 2016 March 2017–May 2017
Workers (W) 25 – 5 7
Social auditors/sustainability oﬃcers of lead ﬁrms (SA) 1 6 2 –
Trade union leaders (TU) 2 – – –
NGO representatives (NR) 1 2 – 1
Tirupur export association representatives (ER) – – – 2
Table 5
Data analytic method.
Stage Process
1 A case in our research is an intermediary-sub-supplier dyad. Therefore, for meaningful comparisons, we separately grouped data based on intermediary-supplier dyads.
This enabled us to create unique narratives for each dyad.
2 a) We iteratively analysed the interview data related to each intermediary-supplier dyad to develop a chronological account of key incidents that sub-supplier and
intermediaries encountered related to social sustainability requirements.
b) We added context to these narratives using data collected using other methods and from other actors. This helped us to trace the sequence of events and to understand
the contextual nuances around the events.
3 We followed a systematic coding process recommended for qualitative data (Strauss and Corbin, 1990).
a) Using manual colour coding method, we began the data analysis process with inductive open coding of interviews to help in data reduction. Rather than imposing an
existing typology or taxonomy onto our data, we pursued an open search for categories. This inductive categorization process resulted in broad themes such as sub-
suppliers’ and intermediaries' interpretations of social sustainability requirements, the practices they adopted to cope with them, motivations, challenges and outcomes.
Properties of these broad themes were also identiﬁed and labelled for further analysis.
b) Axial coding followed the open coding process to link and re-group inductively generated open codes into meaningful abstract codes. Additionally, in this stage, via a
combination of inductive and deductive thinking, we began to relate the axial codes to the adopted theoretical constructs, namely framing, associated procedures
fairness perception or reciprocal behaviour, and deﬁned and labelled emerging new constructs (see Table 6 for the operationalisation of these constructs).
c) Each dyad was coded individually using the process described above.
d) We discussed the resultant themes among ourselves, and any confusions and inconsistencies were rectiﬁed though constant discussions.
4 The intra-dyad analysis was followed by inter-dyad analysis. This helped us to understand the inﬂuence of diﬀerent types of intermediaries' framing on perceptions of
fairness and reciprocity among sub-suppliers.
5 To strengthen the reliability and validity of the emergent constructs we engaged in the following activities (Braun and Clarke, 2006; Miles and Huberman, 1994):
a) Patton (2002) criteria for internal homogeneity and external heterogeneity were used to test if the ﬁnal themes or categories that emerged out of our coding process
were supported by coherent data and that there was a clear distinction between themes/categories. Internal homogeneity was achieved by re-reading of the themes
several times to check for coherence in coded data and unique codes were moved to an appropriate theme or removed. External homogeneity was achieved by re-
reading the all emergent categories to check for their distinctiveness.
b) We iteratively consulted the narratives, transcripts, codes and literature.
c) The data from other sources were consulted to check the validity of the ﬁndings.
d) We discussed our ﬁndings with some stakeholders.
e) We discussed the emergent constructs and framework multiple times among ourselves and with our peers to ascertain the robustness of our ﬁndings.
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4.5. Production-dominant framing, procedures and fairness perception
In the production-dominant framing, no social sustainability re-
quirements were presented. One intermediary - sub-supplier dyad (I7-
SS8) fell into this category. Clearly, the relationship that existed be-
tween the sub-supplier and his intermediary was an ad-hoc one. The
intermediary had visited the factory only once before the ﬁrst order was
placed. Since then, the sub-supplier had visited the intermediary to
procure and deliver production orders. This factory was the worst
among those visited during the ﬁeldwork. It did not have the necessary
ventilation and lighting and the employees were working with their
shirts oﬀ. Most of the workers were contracted for low wages and no
social security beneﬁts. Because no demands had been made upon the
sub-supplier to meet any sustainability requirements and the focus was
only on processing the production orders, the sub-supplier perceived
this state of aﬀairs positively and reciprocated positively by attempting
to meet the production order requirements. The dyad (I7-SS8) could
persist, as they are not on the lead ﬁrms’ radar. They are what we refer
to as the “hidden hands” in the making of garments. Fig. 4 depicts these
arguments.
4.6. Factors inﬂuencing intermediaries’ framing of social sustainability
requirements
Although various factors, at diﬀerent levels of analysis, could po-
tentially inﬂuence the framings enacted by intermediaries, we focussed
on the micro-level processes relating to how participants in dyadic re-
lationships thought about and responded to social sustainability re-
quirements. Accordingly, our case research demonstrates the inﬂuence
of one micro-level factor: the ways in which lead ﬁrms impose their
sustainability requirements on intermediaries. The intermediaries in
our sample supplied two types of lead ﬁrms. For some of our sample
intermediaries (I1, I2, I3, I4), the lead ﬁrms were well-known brands
and retailers located in the USA and Europe (including the UK); for
others (I5, I6, I7, I8, I9, I10), the lead ﬁrms were lesser-known brands
and retailers in Europe (including the UK).
Large well-known brands face more stakeholder scrutiny than
lesser-known ones. Consequently, their survival depends on showing
stakeholders that they are aware of the factory conditions under which
their products are manufactured and on oﬀering evidence-based in-
formation pertaining to their rigorous monitoring of their supply
chains. Given that their own codes and audits lacked legitimacy among
their sensitive stakeholder groups, the large well-known brands in our
sample resorted to third-party sustainability certiﬁcation programmes.
The certiﬁcation programmes commonly adopted by Tirupur suppliers
were SA 8000, BSCI, Sedex, and WRAP. On the other hand, the lesser-
known brands directed most of their eﬀorts towards reducing produc-
tion costs, rather than towards improving their social or environmental
performance. As certiﬁcation mechanisms did not help the cost eﬀec-
tiveness of these lead ﬁrms, they used their own codes to manage
working conditions in their supply chains. To a great extent, they relied
on their intermediaries for monitoring and implementation purposes.
By adopting such measures, both types of lead ﬁrms shifted part of
their responsibilities to intermediaries (i.e., ﬁrst-tier suppliers or sour-
cing agents), which were expected to play double-agency (Wilhelm
et al., 2016) or boundary-spanning roles (Soundararajan et al., 2018),
ascertaining that the sub-supplier networks under their control com-
plied with lead ﬁrm expectations in terms of working conditions. The
ways in which the lead ﬁrms shifted their responsibilities in part in-
ﬂuenced the type of framing adopted by their intermediaries towards
social sustainability requirements. Supporting this, one intermediary
who had adopted the opportunity framing (I2) said, I learnt from my
buyer [his lead ﬁrm]. Another intermediary, who had adopted the in-
sulation framing, (I9) said, They put too much pressure on me. When you
ask for support, they will negotiate like they are so poor … Of course I have
to shift the pressure on my suppliers. How much can I handle?
This was also conﬁrmed by the interviews conducted with other
stakeholders. For example, when asked about the relationship between
lead ﬁrms and intermediaries with respect to social sustainability, a
trade union leader said: We also understand how these buyers are. That is
why we don't always blame the owners. You help them, they help others. You
put pressure on them; they put pressure on their suppliers. It is very simple.
There could be more factors in play such as past experiences with sub-
suppliers and dependency on sub-suppliers, thus calling for further re-
search.
5. Crisis, frame maintenance and frame shift
The cluster faced the aftershocks of the Rana Plaza disaster, which
spilled over into Tirupur through the lead ﬁrms during late 2013. As the
lead ﬁrms faced increased stakeholder scrutiny, they exerted more
pressure on their intermediaries to improve working conditions.
Table 6
Operationalisation of key constructs.
Constructs Operationalisation
Opportunity framing Intermediaries' framing of social sustainability as an opportunity to develop.
Insulation framing Intermediaries' framing of social sustainability as a mechanism to avert risk.
Production-dominant framing Intermediaries' framing of social sustainability requirements as irrelevant to risk aversion or development.
Procedures A range of activities that intermediaries under each framing engage in with their sub-suppliers related to social sustainability requirements.
Perceived procedural fairness Sub-suppliers conceptualising their intermediaries' procedures related to social sustainable requirements as sensible, just, reasonable and
realistic.
Perceived procedural unfairness Sub-suppliers conceptualising their intermediaries' procedures related to social sustainable requirements as insensible, unjust, unreasonable
and unrealistic.
Positive reciprocity Sub-suppliers’ cooperative activities in response to their intermediaries' social sustainability requirements.
Negative reciprocity Sub-suppliers’ uncooperative activities in response to their intermediaries' social sustainability requirements.
Fig. 2. Opportunity framing, procedures, fairness perception and reciprocity.
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Coincidentally, a shortage of electrical power that occurred at roughly
the same time. Between 2014 and 2015, Tirupur faced six to 8 h of
power cuts per day, which seriously threatened the cluster's survival.
Those most aﬀected were the sub-suppliers for whom it was not cost
eﬀective to equip their factories with Uninterruptible Power Supply
(UPS) systems or diesel generators. As a result, the overall production
capacity of the cluster decreased. Due to decrease in work, workers
began to leave Tirupur creating severe labour scarcity. During the crisis,
some intermediaries maintained their framing of sustainability re-
quirements and some shifted, which then inﬂuenced their sub-suppliers’
perception of fairness and reciprocity. Below we discuss these dynamics
(Also see Fig. 5).
5.1. Crisis and frame maintenance
While, in general, the intermediaries sourcing from Tirupur strug-
gled to process their orders and meet their delivery deadlines, the in-
termediary – sub-supplier dyads (I2-SS3, I3-SS4, I6-SS7, and I8-SS9)
coordinated eﬀectively to survive the crisis. Due to positive previous
engagements, these intermediaries—who had adopted the opportunity
framing—were more forthcoming in helping their sub-suppliers during
the crisis. The perceptions of fairness held by the sub-suppliers enabled
the engagement in constructive dialogue—an essential condition for
crisis survival (Ulmer 2001)—until ways or mechanisms could be found
to survive the crisis. For example, one intermediary (I2) said: No one
could run the factory at full capacity. We were begging the Tamil Nadu
government to sort it out … There was a huge demand for UPS [Unin-
terruptible Power Supply] and generators. So, they were very expensive. He
[SS3] deﬁnitely needed some support to install them. When asked about it,
his sub-supplier (SS3) responded: I did not know what to do. I was
thinking of leaving this business. Brother [referring to his intermediary] gave
me money to install UPS. He said ‘No hurry, pay me back gradually’.
With respect to those cases in which intermediaries maintained the
opportunity framing and continued to engage in constructive proce-
dures, the perceptions of fairness held by sub-suppliers were ampliﬁed.
For example, one sub-supplier (SS9) said: You should stay faithful to ones
who oﬀer water when you are dying of thirst. In another example, sub-
supplier (SS3), who was attempting to meet only the minimum re-
quirements, begun to reciprocate more positively by implementing
more worker-friendly measures to improve employee relations. He said:
I learned many small, small things. The fans in the factory ﬂoor were not
giving enough air. Workers were sweating, especially in the peak summer. I
installed more fans. I know this is not going to give me a price rise.
On the other hand, some intermediaries maintained the insulation
framing with their sub-suppliers even during the crisis (I4-SS5, I9-SS10
and I10-SS11). This, and its related procedures, did not enable the ef-
fective coordination between those intermediaries and their sub-sup-
pliers during the crisis. Also, the fact that those intermediaries main-
tained the insulation framing increased hostility between them and
their sub-suppliers, leading to negative reciprocity. One sub-supplier
(SS5) said: I could not even get him [I4] on the phone. He was always busy.
I have friends and family who helped me. Think about people who could not
get any help … What to do. The world is full of selﬁsh people and we have to
live among them. In another example, when a sub-supplier (SS11) faced
the severe ﬁnancial need to pay back a bank loan he had secured to
operate the factory, he did not receive any help from his intermediary
(I10). As a result, he had to close his factory in 2015 and sell both the
building and equipment.
5.2. Crisis and frame shift
Our longitudinal analysis showed how, over time, two inter-
mediaries shifted the way in which they framed the sustainability re-
quirements to their sub-suppliers either a) from insulation to opportu-
nity (I1-SS1 and SS2) or b) from opportunity to insulation (I5 –SS6).
Below, we show these shifts and the factors that triggered them. See
Tables 7–9 for a summary of the framing before, during, and after the
crisis.
On realizing the problems that the insulation framing can create,
especially during a crisis situation, one intermediary (I1) shifted his
framing from insulation to opportunity over time. In a recent interview,
intermediary I1 said: I could see that they [SS1 and SS2] did not trust me. I
knew that they were lying to me. I have been in this business for some time
and I can sense who is lying and who is not. Not good. Not good. I had to
change my approach to make them listen to me. Things are much better now.
At least they do not lie anymore, which is a good start.
When asked about the current perception about the intermediary
(I1), his sub-supplier (SS1) said: The power cut issue was very serious.
People were losing business. Workers were leaving. It was hard to retain
workers. They were losing conﬁdence. We had to keep aside our diﬀerences
if we were to survive. We spoke a lot about these issues. He gave me a lot of
ideas about power maintenance … We are in a much, much better place
now. We speak about workers, about business, politics, family. This was
also conﬁrmed by another sub-supplier of I1 (SS2): I don't know what
happened. Brother [referring to his intermediary] has changed a lot. Earlier
we cannot even sit and talk for 5 min. Now, he talks for hours [laughing].
Fig. 3. Insulation framing, procedures, fairness perception and reciprocity.
Fig. 4. Production-dominant framing, procedures, fairness perception and reciprocity.
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Both sub-suppliers reciprocated positively by improving the condi-
tions of their factories. During recent visits to their factories, visible
changes were observed—e.g., improved ventilation and lighting,
change of ﬂooring, worker awareness posters on the walls, and better
toilets. Conﬁrming the changes, a worker from SS1 said: We recently
formed many committees. Harassment committee. Health and safety com-
mittee. Fire safety committee … I think my owner wants to grow.
Although the government eventually solved the power crisis in
2016, the shocks created by it and by the increases in electricity tariﬀs
continued to haunt the cluster. Recent ﬁeldwork has shown that the
crisis was on the verge of being resolved and that business was getting
better in Tirupur. Even after the crisis was over, intermediary I1
maintained the opportunity framing of sustainability requirements.
Similarly, his sub-suppliers (SS1 and SS2) also held their perceptions
and reciprocal behaviours after the end of the crisis. Opportunity
framing and its associated constructive procedures increased the in-
termediaries' and sub-suppliers’ familiarity with the beneﬁts that could
follow. When asked about it, sub-supplier SS1 said: A lot has changed in
my factory. My workers respect me more. They are happy. I'm happy. Why
would someone go back? Similarly, during a recent interview, sub-sup-
plier SS2 exhibited increased familiarity with the beneﬁts of social
sustainability requirements, He said: I like my factory now. This is how I
have to move to the next level.
A frame shift from opportunity to insulation in the wake of the crisis
was also observed in the case of intermediary I5, whose immediate
reaction to the crisis had been to protect his business. So, he began to
shift from opportunity to insulation framing and adopted an attitude of
intimidation towards his sub-supplier (SS6), as the latter said:We are all
struggling. If he [I5] put pressure on me, what can I do? The intermediary's
change of framing inﬂuenced his sub-supplier's perception of fairness
and reciprocal behaviour, which became hostile. The latter said: He was
not like this before. I do not know if he is under pressure. But, he is not like
before. I think he lost a lot of money during the electricity problem. I don't
know. I had problems too. But I'm the same. Do you see any changes in me?
[laughing].
However, a recent interview with sub-supplier SS6, conducted after
the crisis was over, shows that the intermediary had moved back to
opportunity framing. Our research shows that ﬁnancial pressure played
an important role in the intermediary's initial shift to insulation. The
sub-supplier's perception of fairness also shifted back; he said: He was
under a lot of ﬁnancial pressure. He did not want to lose his business. Now,
he is all right. He felt bad about his actions. Now business is as usual.
Fig. 5. Crisis, frame maintenance and frame shift.
Table 7
Initial framing of intermediaries, and perception of fairness and reciprocity of sub-suppliers.
Opportunity framing, fair perception and positive
reciprocity associated with the opportunity framing
Insulation framing, unfair perception and negative
reciprocity associated with the insulation framing
Production-dominant framing, fair perception and positive
reciprocity associated with the production-dominant framing
I2-SS3, I3-SS4, I5-SS6, I6-SS7, I8-SS9 I1-SS1 and SS2, I4-SS5, I9-SS10, I10-SS11 I7-SS8
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On querying this, the intermediary (I5) highlighted the inﬂuence of
familiarity with the beneﬁts on his change of framing: The power pro-
blem increased my BP [Blood Pressure]. My customers [referring to the lead
ﬁrms] were not very concerned. They said we can't compromise on labour.
So, I showed it on him. Poor guy. It did not help us to move forward though
… I have made a promise to him that he will get all necessary support as
usual to develop and stay in business.
6. Discussion
Our research demonstrates how the diﬀerent framings of sustain-
ability requirements adopted by intermediaries (i.e. opportunity, in-
sulation, and production-dominant) and their associated procedures
can elicit diﬀerent perceptions of fairness (i.e., fair or unfair) in sub-
suppliers, and how such diﬀerent perceptions can give rise to the latter
adopting diﬀerent types of reciprocal behaviours (i.e., positive or ne-
gative). The longitudinal nature of our study also enabled us to evaluate
how a crisis can aﬀect the intermediaries’ framings and the consequent
perceptions and behaviours of their sub-suppliers. In the following
sections, we discuss the ﬁndings that emerged from our inductive study
in detail and oﬀer propositions that open a platform for further theo-
retical and empirical advancements in the ﬁeld of sustainable supply
chains in general.
6.1. The framing of social sustainability requirements, perceptions of
fairness, and reciprocity
Our ﬁndings show that intermediaries frame social sustainability
requirements as opportunity, insulation, or production-dominant.
Under each type of framing, intermediaries engage in various proce-
dures. Each of these types of framing and their associated procedures
inﬂuence the perceptions of the fairness of social sustainability re-
quirements held by sub-suppliers. Under opportunity framing, inter-
mediaries engage in constructive dialogue, creation of awareness, and
sharing of knowledge, and oﬀer ﬁnancial incentives. Opportunity
framing and its associated procedures emphasize beneﬁts to sub-sup-
pliers. Whenever individuals seek to make decisions, they perceive any
gains as fair (Kimes and Wirtz, 2003), and perceptions of fairness lead
to positive reciprocity (Bosse et al., 2009). Accordingly, when inter-
mediaries frame social sustainability requirements as opportunity and
engage in various procedures that are perceived as fair by sub-suppliers,
the latter reciprocate positively by engaging in activities that range
from meeting minimum requirements to improving employee relations.
Therefore, we propose the following:
P1a. The framing of social sustainability requirements as opportunities by
intermediaries and the associated supportive procedures are more likely to
lead to perceptions of fairness and positive reciprocity by sub-suppliers.
Under an insulation framing, intermediaries engage in limited dia-
logue and sharing of knowledge, and adopt threatening attitudes.
Insulation framing and its associated procedures emphasize losses.
Whenever individuals seek to make decisions, they perceive any losses
as unfair (Kimes and Wirtz, 2003), and perceptions of unfairness lead to
negative reciprocity (Bosse et al., 2009). Accordingly, when inter-
mediaries frame social sustainability requirements as insulation and
engage in various procedures that are perceived as unfair by sub-sup-
pliers, the latter reciprocate negatively by demonstrating hostility and
engaging in deceptive activities. These arguments lead to the following
proposition:
P1b. The framing of social sustainability requirements as insulation by
intermediaries and the associated unsupportive procedures are more likely to
lead to perceptions of unfairness and negative reciprocity by sub-suppliers.
Under the production-dominant framing, intermediaries do not re-
quire sub-suppliers to comply with any social sustainability require-
ments. Their only requirement is the production of high quality gar-
ments on time. This causes sub-suppliers to develop positive
perceptions and an associated positive reciprocity only related to pro-
cessing production orders. Thus, we propose the following:
P1c. The production-dominant framing and the associated procedures of
intermediaries are more likely to lead to perceptions of fairness and positive
reciprocity by sub-suppliers in relation only to processing production orders.
In general, opportunity framing enables intermediaries and sub-
suppliers to interact more freely than insulation framing does.
Opportunity framing improves trust and opens doors for frequent in-
teractions and the sharing of knowledge—be it to attain minimum
compliance or to progress beyond it. Both parties beneﬁt from such
interactions. Intermediaries can successfully perform their double-
agency or boundary-spanner roles, while sub-suppliers can stay in
Table 8
Intermediaries’ framing during the crisis, and perception of fairness and reciprocity of sub-suppliers.
Table 9
Intermediaries’ framing after the crisis, and perception of fairness and reciprocity of sub-suppliers.
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business. Trust is important in solving relationally-oriented inter-or-
ganizational problems (Heide and John, 1992). Research has shown
that trust between supply chain partners leads to long-term supply
chain relationships by enabling better communication and information
sharing (Wang et al., 2014). It prevents supply chain partners from
acting opportunistically even if it involves gaining short-term beneﬁts
(Johnston et al., 2004). In contrast, insulation framing leads to hostile
relationships characterized by lack of trust and interactions. It creates
conditions in which intermediaries need to spend their time and energy
on assessing the integrity, trustworthiness, and reliability of sub-sup-
pliers instead of on collaborative eﬀorts. Therefore, we propose:
P1d. Opportunity framing of social sustainability requirements is more likely
than insulation framing to lead to better relationships and to the sharing of
knowledge between intermediaries and sub-suppliers.
6.2. Crises and the framing of sustainability requirements
According to Kim and Cameron (2011), the occurrence of crises
disturbs an individual's present framing. Crises create conditions in
which individuals evaluate the costs-beneﬁts linked to the adoption of a
type of framing and modify it if necessary (Coombs, 2007). Accord-
ingly, our ﬁndings show that, during a crisis, some intermediaries
maintained their choice of framing while others shifted theirs. With
regards to frame maintenance, some intermediaries maintained op-
portunity framing. They continued to engage in supportive procedures,
such as oﬀering ﬁnancial support and sharing knowledge to help their
suppliers survive the crisis. This further ampliﬁed the perceptions of
fairness held by their sub-suppliers, eventually fostering positive re-
ciprocal behaviours on their part.
On the other hand, some intermediaries maintained insulation
framing even during a crisis. They continued to engage in unsupportive
procedures such as threats. As sub-suppliers are usually resource-de-
prived (Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi, 2010; Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen,
2014), they expected increased support from their intermediaries
during a crisis. As this did not happen, therefore, insulation framing and
unsupportive procedures ampliﬁed the perceptions of unfairness held
by sub-suppliers, eventually resulting in increased negative reciprocal
behaviours.
A similar observation can be found in the crisis management lit-
erature (Kim and Cameron, 2011). For example, Kim and Cameron
(2011) argued that a crisis inﬂuences the emotions of those individuals
who experience it; these, in turn, inﬂuence their perceptions of and
behaviours towards others. During a crisis, opportunity framing elicits
positive emotions (i.e., happiness), while insulation framing prompts
negative ones (i.e., sadness), aﬀecting how sub-suppliers reciprocate.
Drawing on these arguments, we propose:
P2a. The maintenance, by intermediaries, of an opportunity framing of
social sustainability requirements and of its associated supportive procedures
even during a crisis is more likely to amplify perceptions of fairness and
positive reciprocity in sub-suppliers.
P2b. The maintenance, by intermediaries, of an insulation framing of social
sustainability requirements and of its associated unsupportive procedures
even during a crisis is more likely to amplify perceptions of unfairness and
negative reciprocity in sub-suppliers.
With regard to shifts in framing types, the research shows that these
enable individuals to experience the costs and beneﬁts of the other
option (Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2006). They enable them to identify
and benchmark the most appropriate framing and make constant
comparisons (Royal, 2008). The operational beneﬁts of adopting op-
portunity framing and of its associated procedures include an increased
social sustainability performance of supply chains, improved relation-
ships with sub-suppliers, the development of the social management
capabilities (Huq et al., 2016) of sub-suppliers, and eﬀective crisis
management. Conversely, insulation framing and its associated proce-
dures lead to a reduced social sustainability performance of supply
chains, hostile relationships with sub-suppliers, and ineﬀective crisis
management. During the crisis, intermediary I1 shifted his adopted
framing from insulation to opportunity; however, on realizing the
beneﬁts of adopting opportunity framing, he maintained such framing
even after the crisis had ended. Furthermore, his sub-suppliers also
maintained their positive reciprocal behaviour after the end of the
crisis.
Conversely, in the case of intermediary I5, the shift from opportu-
nity to insulation framing was only temporary. After the crisis was over,
he shifted back to opportunity framing. His experience with the beneﬁts
of opportunity framing acted as a benchmark for constant comparisons,
which eventually prompted him to shift back to it. Others, who had
adopted insulation framing, had no benchmarks for comparison and
therefore maintained it both during and after the crisis. These argu-
ments lead to our ﬁnal proposition:
P2c. Those intermediaries who can compare the operational outcomes/
beneﬁts of the opportunity and insulation framing of social sustainability
requirements and their associated procedures are more likely to maintain
opportunity framing or to shift back from insulation to opportunity framing.
7. Conclusion
The lack of information and the absence of direct control intensify
the challenges faced by lead ﬁrms in managing social sustainability in
multi-tier global supply chains beyond ﬁrst-tier suppliers—the hotspots
for unsustainable conduct (Grimm et al., 2016; Wilhelm et al., 2016).
The realisation of the complexities associated with the direct manage-
ment of the social sustainability practices adopted by sub-suppliers has
led lead ﬁrms to transferring their responsibilities to intermediaries,
such as ﬁrst-tier suppliers and sourcing agents. However, research has
just begun to the scratch the surface of the relationship between in-
termediaries and sub-suppliers with respect to the management of
supply chain sustainability (e.g., Soundararajan et al., 2018; Wilhelm
et al., 2016). Our study complements these studies by shedding light on
the ‘micro-level behavioural processes’ (Staw and Sutton, 2000) in-
volved in the exchanges between sub-suppliers and intermediaries with
respect to social sustainability.
Using an in-depth longitudinal study of intermediary-sub-supplier
dyads operating in the South Indian garment industry, we show that the
framing of social sustainability requirements by intermediaries and
their associated procedures play an important role in inﬂuencing sub-
supplier perceptions of procedural fairness, which, in turn, inﬂuence
their reciprocal behaviours.
Further, the longitudinal nature of this study enabled us to capture
the inﬂuence of a crisis that serendipitously emerged within its context
and time frame. The ﬁndings show that a crisis does not have equal
inﬂuence on the micro-processes. Some intermediaries maintain their
framing types while others shift theirs. Framing maintenance ampliﬁes
the perceptions of fairness and the reciprocal behaviours associated
with a particular framing type. Maintaining the opportunity framing
ampliﬁes the perceptions of fairness and the positive reciprocity in sub-
suppliers. Correspondently, maintaining the insulation framing am-
pliﬁes the perceptions of unfairness and the negative reciprocity in sub-
suppliers. Frame shifts enable the intermediary – sub-supplier dyads to
experience the other option, analyse the cost-beneﬁts ratios linked to
diﬀerent framings, and either shift back or maintain accordingly.
7.1. Theoretical implications
Our study makes four signiﬁcant contributions to diﬀerent strands
of literature. First, our longitudinal inductive study empirically grounds
the processual and dynamic ways in which developing country sub-
suppliers respond to the social sustainability requirements imposed by
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their intermediaries. The adoption of a micro-level lens shows the im-
portance of intermediaries’ framing in triggering diﬀerent types of
procedural fairness perceptions and reciprocity in developing country
sub-suppliers. Although located in similarly challenging contexts for the
management of social sustainability demands, not all sub-suppliers
engaged in opportunistic or deceptive activities in the pursuit of self-
interest, thus conﬁrming the arguments of the bounded self-interest
model (Bosse et al., 2009). Instead, their perceptions of fairness and
consequent actions were conditioned by how the sustainability re-
quirements were framed and procedures associated with them. The
novel contribution of the study is the inﬂuence of framing of social
sustainability requirements on sub-supplier behaviours. We do not
however argue that the content of sustainability requirements is un-
important. The ﬁndings show that even well designed social sustain-
ability mechanisms can lead to unfair perception and negative re-
ciprocity of sub-suppliers if framed as insulation.
Second, our longitudinal methodology enabled us to study the
framing maintenance and framing shift induced by crises situations.
The wider industry-level social shocks (Huq et al., 2016) sparked by the
Rana Plaza incident and a local power supply crisis elevated the gains of
the opportunity framing and the losses of the insulation one. On rea-
lizing the gains and losses, one intermediary in the insulation framing
shifted to the opportunity framing and maintained the framing. This
ﬁnding is in line with the preference reversal construct in prospect
theory (Tversky et al., 1990), which suggests that, when considering
gains, individuals tend to minimize risks by exhibiting risk-aversion
behaviours. In contrast, when considering losses, individuals tend to
reduce or eliminate them by exhibiting risk-seeking behaviours, even
when the costs are high (Tversky et al., 1990). Our ﬁndings expand
these arguments by demonstrating the contingency eﬀects of the cost/
beneﬁt comparison on frame maintenance.
Our ﬁndings also conﬁrm the importance of managing positive
stakeholder relationships pre-crisis so that an eﬀective coordination
emerges during a crisis (Ulmer, 2001). In addition, our ﬁndings show
that crises enable the learning related to crisis management and the
development of ﬁrm capabilities that go beyond it by triggering new
knowledge development, increasing motivation to search for causes and
solutions, improving ability to learn and absorptive capacity
(Christianson et al., 2009). The path dependent nature of knowledge
acquisition and learning by sub-suppliers are conﬁrmed by these ﬁnd-
ings. Overall, these ﬁndings show the importance of serendipity that
contributes to unanticipated ﬁndings and to the reformulation of the
general theory (Ketokivi and Choi, 2014).
Third, our study demonstrates the coupled eﬀect of framing of social
sustainability requirements and its associated procedures on fairness
perceptions and reciprocal behaviour of sub-suppliers. This shows that
framing per se cannot create changes in sub-supplier behaviours.
Framing can act as a trigger to make sub-suppliers perceive the sig-
niﬁcance of social sustainability; however, it has to be combined with
the appropriate procedures, including incentives (Wilhelm et al., 2016)
and awareness-creating initiatives (Huq et al., 2016) to make them
continually see the beneﬁts linked to implementing social sustain-
ability.
Fourth, our ﬁndings related to negative reciprocity show how some
sub-suppliers rationalised their own unethical behaviour toward
workers based on their treatment by the intermediary. Bandura (1999)
refers to this as displacement of responsibility, which involves in-
dividuals rationalising unethical behaviour by displacing the responsi-
bility of their action onto others. Such rationalisations of sub-suppliers
can be further studied through moral disengagement theory, which
focuses on cognitive mechanism individuals employ to rationalise their
unethical behaviour.
Finally, we add momentum to a recent eﬀort to shift research on
behavioural operations management (Croson et al., 2013), but with a
qualitative case study twist, by which it can address vital questions
about the extent to which sub-supplier responses to intermediary
requirements are inﬂuenced by psychological factors and socio-cogni-
tive processes. While there is an increasing recognition of micro-level
interactions in supply chain relationships (Borgatti and Li, 2009), re-
search in the area of social sustainability in supply chains has not
delved deep into the life experiences and routines of sub-suppliers.
Thus, we call for more research to dig deeper into the perceptual factors
and associated socio-cognitive processes that inﬂuence intermediary
framing and developing country sub-supplier everyday management of
social and environmental sustainability among all the other challenges
they face.
7.2. Managerial implications
Our study oﬀers numerous practical recommendations for lead ﬁrms
and intermediaries to manage social sustainability in supply chains.
Lead ﬁrms are partly responsible for their intermediaries' framing of
sustainability requirements. Their own framings can spillover to shape
their intermediaries’ framings and management of social sustainability
in the entire supply chain. Lead ﬁrms tend to invest in developing and
using sophisticated mechanisms like certiﬁcations and multi-stake-
holder initiatives to address social sustainability issues (Locke et al.,
2009; Soundararajan and Brown, 2016); however, the adoption of in-
appropriate framing and unsupportive procedures can hinder their ef-
fective implementation. The use of power and pressure to implement
social sustainability results in unfair perceptions and negative re-
ciprocity under many circumstances.
Further, our study illuminates the ﬂaws in the current forms of so-
cial sustainability initiatives. A key ﬂaw is that the perspectives of sub-
suppliers from developing countries are often neglected. But, ironically,
that is where the majority of the production activities occur. Thus, their
voices must be included in the development of any sustainability in-
itiatives they are required to implement in order to improve their
perceived fairness and positive reciprocity. Partners, large or small,
powerless or powerful, need to work together to yield mutually bene-
ﬁcial outcomes.
Furthermore, our study oﬀers some practical implications for the
management of crises in supply chains. Due to their geographical and
institutional spread, multi-tier supply chains are prone to diﬀerent
forms of crises (Jüttner, and Maklan, 2011). Better supply chain re-
lationships are critical for eﬀective crisis management (Chopra and
Sodhi, 2004). The ﬁndings show that pre-crisis framing is an important
antecedent to how relationships work during crisis (Kim and Cameron,
2011). This insight reinforces the path-dependent nature of the re-
lationship between intermediaries and sub-suppliers. The study's ﬁnd-
ings related to crisis also show that the framing of social sustainability
requirements can have many unintended consequences.
7.3. Limitations and future research directions
Our study of the micro-level interactions between intermediaries
and sub-suppliers in developing countries with respect to social sus-
tainability management is only a starting point. We oﬀer numerous
testable propositions for future research. More needs to be done to
develop an in-depth understanding of the framing, fairness perception,
reciprocity, and factors that shape them. For example, future research
can explore the antecedents of diﬀerent framings adopted by inter-
mediaries. While lead ﬁrm behaviour in part contributes to an inter-
mediary's framing, many other factors related to context and personal
characteristics can also play a part. We would also encourage re-
searchers to scrutinize the eﬀects of framing on speciﬁc issues of
working conditions or social sustainability. For example, opportunity
framing may not have the same eﬀect on collective bargaining due to
local customs. Also, the inﬂuence of framing on the fairness perceptions
of sub-suppliers can be contingent upon numerous factors beyond those
associated with crises. Future research should explore these factors.
Further, our study focused only on the intermediaries and sub-
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suppliers connected through informal spot production order contracts.
Future research is needed to understand if the ﬁndings are applicable if
formal long-term contracts are in place. As mentioned, sub-supplier
behaviour can be subjected to spillover eﬀects due to the framing of
other current and past intermediaries. Although we used certain com-
partmentalisation strategies to maintain the uniqueness of the data
collected, we cannot certainly discount the spillover eﬀects. Therefore,
future research is needed to understand the nature of these spillover
eﬀects and its inﬂuence on the study's insights.
Furthermore, our study emphasizes procedures like dialogue and
knowledge sharing as mediating mechanisms that connect framing and
fairness perceptions. Future research can build on this and explore more
mediating mechanisms. Although this study only explores social sus-
tainability (mainly working conditions), the proposed constructs could
be applied to other dimensions of sustainability requirements.
However, the eﬀects and boundary conditions may diﬀer, which calls
for future research.
We used interviews as the primary method of data collection; these
oﬀer retrospective accounts at multiple points in time and may limit our
understanding of the messy day-to-day interactions between inter-
mediaries and sub-suppliers. While an ethnographic method is the best
alternative, it may not be practically possible to use it in studies that
focus on developing country actors and on ‘sensitive issues’ (Lee, 1993)
such as social sustainability. However, in other disciplines there are
precedents for ethnography-based studies on working conditions in
developing country supplier facilities (De Neve, 2008). Future research
on operations management can refer to these works to explore and
utilize the power of more ethnographically oriented work for studying
social sustainability among developing country intermediaries and sub-
suppliers. When it is practically impossible to conduct ethnographic
studies, researchers can use a combination of methods that includes
participant and non-participant observations, and informal conversa-
tions.
There is a need to do further research on the inﬂuence of crises on
social sustainability in multi-tier supply chains. We suggest that a
conﬁgurational approach (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2005) may oﬀer a
tremendous opportunity to explore how diﬀerent factors combine to
inﬂuence the eﬀect that crises have on social sustainability in supply
chains. A conﬁgurational approach also enables the understanding of
how a speciﬁc type of crisis, when combined with various factors, in-
ﬂuences framing and fairness perceptions. Another avenue for research
involve considering how and when framing contributes to the devel-
opment of crisis prevention capabilities. More research is also needed to
understand the inﬂuence of crisis on intermediaries framing and the
dynamic inﬂuences that follow. Our ﬁndings related to crisis are based
on two dyads that shifted their framings during crisis. Therefore, more
case research is needed to test the robustness of these ﬁndings and
expand them. Speciﬁcally, more research is needed to understand the
antecedents of frame maintenance and frame shift and its inﬂuence on
sub-suppliers’ fairness perceptions and reciprocity.
Finally, the generalizability of our ﬁndings is arguably limited.
While we think that the core themes of our analysis are likely to be
applicable to intermediaries and sub-suppliers located in other devel-
oping country contexts such as those of China or Bangladesh, further
research is indeed needed to explore the boundary conditions to the
application of our model. In addition, intermediaries and sub-suppliers
in the supply chains of forest products, or in the consumer electronics
are big and powerful (Wilhelm et al., 2016). The relational dynamics of
these dyads can be diﬀerent from those that were explored in this study.
Thus, research on the micro-level exchanges between these dyads with
respect to the management of social sustainability can oﬀer novel in-
sights.
Appendix 1. Opportunity framing, procedures, fairness perception and reciprocity
Dyad Opportunity framing Procedures Perception of fairness Positive reciprocity
I3-SS4 Having good labour conditions
are seen very positively in this
business. I know it is not easy
to maintain working hours, ESI
and PF [social security]. But,
they [SS4] need to try.
(Intermediary: I3)
I'm happy to help them with
anything they [SS4] need. They
just need to ask me.
(Intermediary: I3)
I needed money to build toilets.
I had ﬁnancial constraints at
that time. I visited my bank
numerous times. They asked
for this document and that
document. I shared my
frustration with him [I3]; he
immediately made a phone call
to the bank manager and asked
him to help me out. (Sub-
supplier: SS4)
How many out there will be
willing to make a phone call to
the bank manager for you?
Even my relatives won't. It is
very rare these days to ﬁnd
such people… I can say that he
[I3] won't ask for unnecessary
things. (Sub-supplier: SS4)
Whatever he [I3] asks me to
do. I will do… I have people to
clean toilets every morning. It
shines like a crystal. Did you
see? (Intermediary: I3)
The toilets in our factors are
like a 5-star hotel. You can sit
there and talk (Worker)
I6-SS7 They [SS6] learnt everything
through experience. They
replicate what they learned
when they were workers. I
have to teach them. I have to
tell them [SS6] that compliance
is important for the long-term.
(Intermediary: I6)
Not many in this industry know
what the labour laws say. My
supplier [SS7] was struggling
to meet my requirements. I just
asked for regulations. I asked
my manager to visit his factory
to create awareness. After
visiting the factory, my
manager gave me the idea of
sharing the print materials we
have. (Intermediary: I6)
He does not have to do these
things. He can just order me. I
have to thank god. (Sub-
supplier: SS7)
You can see the pictures
[pointing towards the direction
of the pictures]. It talks about
worker rights. Now, I'm scared
of my workers [laughing].
(Sub-supplier: SS7)
I did not know anything about
my rights. I'm not very
educated. These pictures
taught me a lot. (Worker)
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